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ABSTRACT 
 
In spite of administrative reforms implemented over the past 30 years of 
Renovation Policy (Đổi mới) by the Vietnamese Communist Party with massive 
support from donor agencies, Vietnam's state machinery and bureaucracy has 
largely remained bloated and fragmented. As they evolved from state to market, 
administration and public service did not reform as envisaged in a long-term 
policy that aims to bring Vietnam closer to Western-dominated, normative models 
of "good governance." The ineffectiveness of these reforms has commonly been 
attributed to poor human capacity, weak law enforcement, inconsistent legal 
frameworks and similar types of formal institutional shortcomings, all of which 
ought to be remedied by strengthening formal institutions and capacity building. 
In going beyond such mainstream institutionalist views, this paper appraises 
administrative reforms from a more critical, sociological perspective. It takes into 
account socio-cultural and socio-political institutional factors, such as norms, 
values and worldviews, which often serve as pivotal elements shaping reform 
trajectories and outcomes. Conceptually, the paper draws on a 1987 study by 
Hans-Dieter Evers that traces different types of bureaucratisation as a means to 
unravel the nature of bureaucracy and its evolutionary process through the lens of 
social history. This study elucidates that despite formally proclaimed 
commitments to Weberian bureaucracy, in practice, bureaucratisation as 
currently observable in Vietnam is chiefly featured by strong tendencies of so-
called Orwellisation and Parkinsonisation.  
 
Keywords: Vietnam, administrative reforms, bureaucracy, bureaucratisation, 
institutionalism   
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INTRODUCTION: OMNIPRESENT BUT INEFFECTIVE?  
 
In looking back after 30 years since Vietnam embarked on its transition 
from Soviet-style central planning, it is apparent that the journey has met 
with both manifold successes and considerable contradiction. Fuzzy terms, 
such as market socialism, market Leninism or socialist-oriented market 
economy,
1
 the latter of which is in official use by the Vietnamese 
government, are suggestive of both the ongoing transition from state to 
market as much as the ideological dilemmas stemming from attempts at 
fusing capitalism and socialism. Although there is little doubt that Vietnam's 
Renovation (Đổi mới)2 propelled social modernisation and contributed 
greatly to rising living standards and economic development, it has had 
astonishingly minimal influence on Vietnam's political and administrative 
landscape. Indeed, by systematically excluding political change from the 
reforms, the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) has remained the sole 
political power and thereby practically adhered to Leninist ideologies and 
the respective institutions of governance (Thayer 2009; Fforde 2011). 
Against the backdrop of this enduring "bureaucratic socialism,"
3
 it is 
unsurprising that characteristics such as bureaucratic omnipresence, statism 
and authoritarianism have persisted as hallmarks throughout the post-
Renovation era. The lasting economic dominance of state-owned 
enterprises, top-down development planning, state-centred policy making, 
tight control over civil society, and limited political freedom are, in this 
regard, manifestations of political conservatism rather than indicators of a 
an integral transition away from socialism.   
Having said this, the political leadership has not been unaware of the 
necessity to institutionally adapt one-party rule to accommodate the 
constantly changing social and economic realities. Measures taken to 
administratively adjust to capitalist modes of production to suit global 
fashions of neo-liberal deregulation and privatisation, such as reshuffling 
personnel and streamlining the state machinery, partly favoured state retreat 
and decentralisation, but did not prevent the further mushrooming of state 
structures. Indeed, after more than two decades of "renovating" the one-
party state, Vietnam's bureaucratic apparatus remains huge and pervasive. In 
2006, Painter, an administrative scholar, labelled Vietnam the most 
bureaucratic country in Southeast Asia in terms of organisational 
complexity and numbers of state personnel (Painter 2006: 328). In 2011, 
civil servants numbered 5.3 million, a significant sum for a country with a 
population of about 90 million (Tuổi Trẻ 26 July 2011). The extent of these 
figures is illustrative of the vital role the Leninist state continues to play as a 
source of employment, career options and lifetime secure livelihood in a 
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society otherwise characterised by limited diversity of occupational 
opportunities.
4
 Since 2008, Vietnam's emerging economy has cooled off 
profoundly with growth rates falling short of expectations
5
 due to the 
economic fallout from high inflation, rapidly mounting public debts, mass 
liquidations of private businesses and a real estate market on the brink.
6
 In 
such times of growing insecurity, the (socialist) state, and this includes 
(semi-privatised) state enterprises and the military, constitutes an even more 
favourable option for many seeking income and job security. This not only 
holds true for the capital Hanoi, where a large share of government officials 
is concentrated,
7
 but also for provincial capitals, district towns or rural 
communes, which are endowed with large cohorts of government officials. 
A recently conducted census in Quảng Ninh, one of Vietnam's 63 provinces, 
revealed that the number of beneficiaries on the state's payroll accounts for 
more than six percent of the entire provincial population (Tuổi Trẻ 16 
December 2013).    
The magnitude and omnipresence of the party state is immense. 
Administrative buildings profoundly shape the face of urban areas and rural 
towns. Over the past 10 years, public investment boomed not only in terms 
of infrastructure development, such as new roads, schools or industrial 
parks, but also with regard to the construction of immoderately oversized 
and pompously designed government premises across the whole of the 
country. Whether in the plains or mountains, rural districts or urban towns, 
what all these constructions share is the gradual occupation of space by an 
ever-expanding array of government buildings. In many rural locations, as 
illustrative in Figure 1, oversized and modern administrative buildings, or 
often whole compounds, have replaced old, simple constructions, and now 
outlandishly tower over adjacent paddy fields, thatched farm cottages and 
grassing water buffalos. Equipped with modern facilities and cast in steel, 
concrete and glass, these new bureaucratic facades are icons of ultimate 
state managerialism.  
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Figure 1: Icons of bureaucratic mangerialism. Recently modernised administrative 
premises in Northwest Vietnam, one of the country's most remote, socio-
economically backward and sparsely populated regions.  
 
Figure notes:   
- Top: Parts of the recently completed Lai Châu provincial administrative campus, 
occupying large areas of the inner city of Lai Châu.  
- Middle: Administrative centre of Sìn Hồ district, Lai Châu Province.  
- Bottom: Two of a whole array of newly constructed government buildings at the 
outskirts of Mộc Châu town, Sơn La Province (all photographs by the author 2015). 
 
Looking behind such Potemkin facades of bureaucratic power, however, 
reveals that Vietnam's administration has long been mired by low 
effectiveness, poor performance, red tape, administrative arbitrariness and 
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systemic corruption. Beyond the various constitutional narratives (1992 and 
2014) portraying the Leninist state as tightly organised and committed to 
rational, scientific management and planning, Vietnam's administration and 
governance have been largely fragmented, disconnected and inconsistent 
due to poor allocation of responsibilities, overlapping mandates, as well as 
ministerial fractionism and departmentalism. Different ministerial agencies 
are in disharmony with each other and local government operations are 
often detached from those at the centre (Koh 2001: 536). Since the Leninist 
state came into being in 1954, as empirically documented by MacLean 
(2013), the politics of mistrust and bureaucratic self-interests have gradually 
hollowed out the idea of technocratic and central planning. Over the 
decades, and with this trend continuing in the post-Renovation era, the state 
documentation system has steadily deviated from actual developments on 
the ground. Subsequently, based on these paper realities, the central 
government has continued to draft fuzzy policies and vague legislation. 
While the number of official guidelines and regulations adopted annually is 
enormous, the bulk of these provisions are expected to remain affectless 
because of poor consistency and coordination in their implementation, lack 
of resources and departure from the everyday reality at the grassroots.
8
 This 
has led to some more radical views, such as that of Fforde (2011: 176), who 
views Vietnam as a "land without a king" drifting towards "ungovernability" 
due to a deficit in centralised authority and coordination that has not so 
much to do with the monopoly of political power under the party, but rather 
with the fact that there is so little consistency in governance.   
By evaluating the Vietnamese bureaucracy from a sociological 
perspective, the purpose of this paper
9
 is to make sense of the contradicting 
circumstances depicted above in light of the administrative and public 
service reforms that have been ongoing now for over 15 years. As an 
introduction into the study, the next section seeks to conceptualise 
bureaucracy, bureaucratisation and administrative reforms. Drawing on this, 
subsequently, the analysis will take stock of Vietnam's civil service and 
administrative reforms by tracing different trajectories of bureaucratisation 
in order to capture the underlying nature of the bureaucracy and shed light 
on reform outcomes. The paper argues that beyond the formal reform 
rhetoric emphasising on rationalisation and rolling back the state in the 
meaning of "good governance," in fact, bureaucratisation in Vietnam is 
better described as a process featured by uncontrolled organisational and 
structural state expansion. Statistical data, selected newspaper articles, along 
with an exhaustive literature review and personal observations
10
 build the 
methodological backbone of this analysis.  
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CONCEPTUALISING THE STUDY:  EXPLORING THE NEXUS OF 
BUREAUCRACY, INSTITUTIONS AND REFORMS  
 
Bureaucracy as a Socio-cultural Phenomenon  
 
This section will begin with some theoretical considerations meant to clarify 
the angle from which the state and bureaucracy are evaluated in this paper. 
According to traditional Weberian concepts of state-society relations from 
political sociology, the society and state are assumed to exist as separate 
spheres, with the state treated autonomous from society (Nettle 1968). This 
rather orthodox image of the state-society dichotomy has been increasingly 
rethought, with the effect that the scientific debate has shifted from state-
centred to more holistic approaches that take into account diversity and 
complexity (Sellers 2012). Kerkvliet (2003), for instance, claims that 
administrators cannot be conceived as separate from society; they are as 
much a part of it as anyone else, making state officials subject to the same 
set of societal norms, values, culture and routines. Bureaucratic structures 
thus rarely appear standardised or universal in guise and behaviour, but 
rather highly diversified, taking on manifold forms against different socio-
cultural backgrounds, political cultures and social realities (Migdal 2001). 
Crozier, a French organisational sociologist (1964: 210), portrays 
bureaucracy as a cultural phenomenon that may differ profoundly in 
different parts of the world. The legal-rational and disciplined officialdom in 
the Weberian sense of the term, which emerged in Europe in conjunction 
with the rise of modern nation-states, capitalist modes of production and the 
corresponding rationalisation of society, presents only one possible type of 
bureaucracy. In other societal and cultural environments, as depicted by 
Evers (1987) for Indonesia and Malaysia, modern bureaucracy has not 
evolved endemically. Instead, it mostly entered these societies as a Western 
import of modernity overlaid on traditional, often non-supportive social 
structures and political cultures (Evers and Gerke 2009: 6). Importantly, 
while respective mandates, functions and roles have been formally 
enshrined in the constitutions of these countries, Weberian bureaucracy 
rarely unfold in real life. Instead, traditional, more informal institutions 
forming around patronage, cronyism and kinship have remained persistent 
(or even resistant), eventually giving rise to what has become widely known 
as "bureaucratic capitalism" or "crony capitalism," or systems in which 
bureaucratic-political elites deliberately blur the boundaries between public 
office and private life with the aim to appropriate resources (Robison 1978; 
Evers 1987). Under such conditions, bureaucrats show attributes of what has 
been defined as strategic group. These are quasi-groups whose members are 
IJAPS, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1–40, 2016   Simon Benedikter 
7 
 
united by the common goal of collectively securing present and future 
chances of accessing, sharing and redistributing scarce resources, both 
material and immaterial (Evers and Gerke 2009: 2).       
 
Bureaucracy in the Context of Institutionalism  
 
An institutionalist perspective embracing both formal and informal 
institutions may help to better understand the socio-cultural nature of 
bureaucracy. Institutional theory, in general, falls into two schools of 
thought. First, following rational choice theory, mainstream or classical 
institutionalism assumes that individuals act within institutions in order to 
maximise their personal interests. Institutional scholars from this camp 
argue that formal institutions, such as laws, regulations and organisations 
are set up to govern people's interaction in society and economy (Selznick 
1949; Ericksson 2009). This economic orientation on institutionalism has 
received heavy scrutiny from scholars who have pushed institutional 
theories in a more normative direction. In this formulation, values, norms, 
culture and routines of individuals who form and represent institutions, are 
ascribed a critical role in shaping organisational and behavioural patterns, 
including those of the bureaucracy (March and Olsen 1989; DiMaggio and 
Powell 1991). The role of social structures in shaping individual behaviour, 
for instance, has been emphasised by Archer (2000) and Sayer (2000). In 
the sub-field of critical institutionalism, the history of institutional 
evolvement is seen as crucial for understanding social change. "Path 
dependency," in this context, describes how institutions come into being 
along historical processes, in which modern, traditional, formal and 
informal elements coalesce into patchworks of indigenous and global ideas 
of how things should be done and organised in society (Cleaver 2012). From 
this perspective, the way that the bureaucracy operates in practical terms is 
not only defined by formal institutions such as regulations, provisions and 
coda that frame officialdom, public service provision and administrative 
procedures, but also by informal institutions such as socio-cultural norms, 
values, worldviews, routines that determine a great deal of what constitutes 
administrative culture.  
 
Bureaucracy and Administrative Reforms: Formal vs.  
Informal Institutions  
 
Administrative reforms often aim to institutionally restructure bureaucratic 
organisations, streamline procedures and improve work routines with 
targeted interventions. Typically, these reforms address formal institutional 
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arrangements. By citing the alleged correlation that robust institutions 
promote economic growth, multilateral organisations such as the World 
Bank and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have long 
prescribed institutional adjustments under the banner of "good governance" 
(Aron 2000). According to UN definitions, governance is considered "good" 
and "democratic" to the extent that institutions and processes are transparent 
and accountable. Moreover, good governance is said to promote equity, 
participation, pluralism and the rule of law in an effective and enduring 
manner.
11
 This normative notion of  "good governance," as practically 
deployed in the largely apolitical development discourse (Ferguson 1994), 
however, is less about democratic institutions and human rights, but rather 
emphasises the rationalisation of organisational structures and 
administrative procedures following the principles of Weberian bureaucracy 
in tandem with economic deregulation (Grindle 2007). As Reis argues 
(2014), in the post-Washington Consensus era, "good governance" can be 
equated with "high managerialism," which is a set of rationalised (formal) 
institutions and procedures for managing society, planning development and 
enhancing market mechanisms for maximum economic performance.     
Real life developments, however, are not so simply managed and, 
accordingly, there is often a wide gap between policy and reality. 
Unsurprisingly, mainstream thinking that conceives the policy process as 
scientific-rationale problem solving that is apolitical, mechanic and neat 
have become increasingly contested (Sutton 1999). Over the past two 
decades, scholars have more and more acknowledged the inherently 
political nature of policy interventions, referring to the involvement of 
multiple actors from the state, private sector and civil society with different, 
often competing ideas, worldviews, routines and interests (Haas 1992; Hajer 
1993). Drawing on this, informal institutions like norms, values, culture and 
worldviews have been increasingly recognised as crucial factors in policy 
processes. Leaving aside oversimplified command-and-control models, 
(local) policy implementers have received far more attention as actors 
shaping policy through the implementation process (Lipsky 1993).   
By not denying the diversity of actors involved in policy processes, 
the bureaucracy can be considered a pivotal component in public policy. 
This is even more relevant in state-centred environments of authoritarian 
regimes such as Vietnam, where the lack of extra-bureaucratic forces allows 
the state machinery to dominate politically. The role of the bureaucracy is 
even more decisive when it comes to the formulation and implementation of 
public service reforms, where bureaucracy is both reformer and the object of 
reform. Collective resistance against institutional change is likely to be 
fierce from inside as intended structural interventions easily clash with state 
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official's hidden agendas and vested interests. More precisely, 
administrative reforms brought about by changing formal institutions may 
curtail privileges, impair career prospects, re-draw mandates and diminish 
political influence, thus potentially narrowing bureaucrats' resources and 
power base (Grindle and Thomas 1991). Moreover, new formal institutions 
regulating organisational structures and administrative procedures may 
contradict informal (traditional) institutions inherent to specific forms of 
patronage, cronyism and similar routines that pervade bureaucracy as a 
socio-cultural phenomenon. These may undermine the proper functioning of 
formal institutions such as laws and regulations (Grindle 2012). In sum, 
self-serving interests align with informal institutions based on traditional 
values, norms, culture, worldviews and belief systems (Sabatier and Hunter 
1989), some of which conflict with global models of institutional reform in 
public administration towards "good governance." It is therefore at the 
interface between the persistence informal institutions and formal 
institutional interventions where public administration reform outcomes are 
being shaped, most likely as complex hybrids incorporating elements of 
both.     
 
Bureaucracy and Bureaucratisation: Tracing Institutional Change  
in Administrative Reforms  
 
In the above context, the concept of "path dependency" is useful for tracing 
institutional change. To this end, this paper considers trajectories of 
bureaucratisation and uses them as means for examining administrative 
reform outcomes in Vietnam. In doing so, this analysis builds on an earlier 
study by Evers (1987), who investigated different dimensions of 
bureaucratisation across Southeast Asia. In order to form a typology of 
bureaucracy in Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia, he looked into 
bureaucratisation processes and how they evolved alongside historical 
events, as well as cultural and social developments. The three types of 
bureaucratisation he referred to are outlined as follows:  
 
(1) Weberisation refers to Max Weber's notion of bureaucracy, which 
depicts the imposition of legal-rational institutions of administration 
as part of a process of rationalisation of society. Here, bureaucracy is 
understood as rationalised and disciplined in respect to the fashion in 
which it is organised and behaves. Prominently featuring in this 
model is a clear separation between public office and private life 
supported by adequate remuneration schemes for public service.  
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(2) Orwellisation draws on George Orwell's portrayal of totalitarian-
bureaucratic power and authoritarianism in his world famous novel, 
1984. Here, bureaucratisation is expressed as the mounting 
omnipresence and pervasive control over society.  
(3) Parkinsonisation refers to the Parkinson's Law (see Parkinson 1955), 
which is based on the assumption that bureaucracy naturally tends to 
expand in structural and physical terms. Expansion is mainly driven 
by two factors: first, the desire of state officials' to increase the 
number of their subordinates; and second, the fact that civil servants 
create (unnecessary) work for each other.     
 
All three types of bureaucratisation are interconnected but, nevertheless, 
also exist as independent processes, each developing at its own pace and 
intensity (Evers 1987: 668). Interdependencies, for instance, manifest                
in the relationship between Orwellisation and Parkinsonisation, since 
authoritarianism tendentially favours bureaucratic expansion as a mode of 
pervading society and gaining control over extra-bureaucratic forces. 
Weberisation is expressed in the gradual rationalisation of organisational 
structures and procedures of administration. It also features the promotion of 
a merit-based civil service that is disciplined, transparent, accountable and 
committed to the rule of law, which is similar to the variation promoted in 
"good governance." This, in turn, is closely associated with contemporary 
neo-liberal development paradigms that favour privatisation and state retreat 
as measures for counteracting Parkinsonisation and enhancing government 
performance in economic terms. Outlining these typologies facilitates a 
better understanding of the trajectories of bureaucratisation currently 
underway in Vietnam. Adding to this, institutional theory helps to capture 
the underlying rationalities of these processes, thereby illuminating how 
they are embedded in Vietnam's societal, cultural and historical 
environment. The ensuing section considers recent trends of Weberisation in 
Vietnam and how these have emerged against the backdrop of 
administrative reforms, their corresponding institutional interventions and 
socio-cultural embeddedness.   
 
 
THE WEBERISATION OF VIETNAM: PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION REFORM (PAR) AND THE POLITICAL-
CULTURAL RENAISSANCE OF MERITOCRATIC IDEAS 
 
When the VCP seized power in 1954, policy processes turned, as common 
for Leninist regimes under "mono-organisational socialism,"
12
 into solely 
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state-centred and bureaucratic affairs, leaving no or only limited space for 
public engagement (Porter 1993; Thayer 1995). New opportunities for 
social engagement, however, emerged in the wake of Đổi mới, although 
under close state observation. With the bureaucratic elite doing its utmost to 
keep political change off the reform agenda, social engagement has been 
limited to relatively non-political spheres such as social relief work, poverty 
alleviation, the environment or health (Wischermann 1999; Thayer 2009). 
Party members, bureaucrats and others affiliated with the political system 
feared that once a certain tipping point is exceeded, reforms might track into 
territory located beyond their reach and control (Thayer 2009). Whereas 
public engagement in policy-making remained limited, donors and their 
implementing agencies gained ground in domestic policy processes, at least 
in respect to policy formulation. It was in the late 1980s, just after the 
bipolar world older began to decline, that Western governments and 
multilateral organisations began to resume diplomatic relations with the 
socialist regime in the hopes that supporting economic reforms would 
eventually yield political change in favour of democratic institutions.
13
 
Although this invariably proved to be overoptimistic, with the system 
remaining strongly authoritarian, donors were and still are attracted by the 
country's nimbus of being a "success story" in rapid development, 
modernisation and poverty reduction, and nevertheless gradually intensified 
their engagement with the party state. One result is that Vietnam has 
become a top destination for official development assistance (ODA) and a 
"donor darling" (Cling et al. 2009; Olivié 2011); Vietnam has come to be 
seen as a place where, at least putatively, "development" is manageable and 
plannable using the right policy choices and institutional interventions. 
Despite lingering real world governance challenges, what earned Vietnam 
the title of best-practice (or model) country was, as Reis (2014) claims, the 
Leninist state's formal rational planning machinery, which delivered the 
image of sound and proper development policy making through its 
command-and-control system of rational administration, target-oriented 
planning and rigid top-down implementation. Whether public health, 
education, macro-economy or the environment, one rarely finds a policy 
sphere in contemporary Vietnam that remains without exhaustive efforts 
undertaken by the World Bank, UNDP, Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
and others to impose on policy formulation, albeit with little influence when 
it comes to implementation.   
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Weberisation and Good Governance in Vietnam:  
The Mainstream Perspective   
 
PAR, which began to take off in the early 1990s, has been no exception to 
the imposition of outside influence. From the very beginning, government 
attempts to implement market-based economic principles in conjunction 
with administrative reforms in the spirit of "good governance" have 
received strong financial and technical support from the Western-dominated 
donor community (Buhmann 2007). Initially, administrative reforms 
manifested in many forms but these activities remained mostly isolated from 
each other, targeting issues such as decentralisation (Fritzen 2006), state-
owned enterprise reforms (Fforde 2007), empowering the National 
Assembly or the People's Councils (both representing legislative state 
power) (UNDP 2001), or promoting grassroots participation (Minh Nhut 
Duong 2004). Since 2000, a great deal of these initiatives have come under 
the banner of the Master Programme for PAR (Prime Minister of Vietnam 
2001). Briefly, the first programme period, running from 2001 to 2010,
14
 
comprised the following four main components:  
 
 Institutional reforms 
 Streamlining organisational structures 
 Civil service reforms 
 Strengthening public finances and fiscal reforms  
 
Interventions such as downsizing staff, streamlining organisational setups, 
decentralisation, facilitating cross-sectoral workflows at national and sub-
national levels, as well as curbing party hegemony over state management 
were expected to harmonise and optimise administrative procedures and 
remove overlapping mandates within the apparatus (UNDP 2001: 15; 
Painter 2006: 325). Following the models of bureaucratisation outlined in 
the previous section, PAR therefore addresses problems typically presented 
by Parkinsonisation, while at the same time promoting Weberisation 
through a new civil service codex and salary reforms. Adequate earnings are 
the prerequisite to ensure disciplined behaviour of civil servants and 
improve ethics and integrity for the purposes of combating corruption and 
other forms of malpractice. Along with this, in the hope of stimulating merit 
as the key feature of officialdom, civil servants are obligated to prove their 
professional expertise and qualification by holding academic decrees in 
accordance with their positions, and by passing compulsory examinations 
for recruitment and promotion.  
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Figure 2: State propaganda billboards promoting public service reforms. 
 
Figure notes:  
- Left: "The party (apparatus) and the people of Can Tho City decisively build up a 
transparent and strong administration!"   
- Right: "Can Tho City decisively builds up a corps of cadres and civil servants that 
serves the people with all its strengths" (photographs by the author, 2011, Can Tho 
City [Mekong Delta], translation by the author). 
 
In essence, PAR is all about building a bureaucracy that is disciplined, 
service-oriented, tightly regulated and responsive to people's needs; a 
bureaucracy that is accountable, transparent, less prone to corruption, and 
committed to a clear separation between private and public life. This is 
nothing short of a new administrative and public service culture (Figure 2). 
Expectations were high as articulated in the following statement by the 
Ministry of Home Affairs, the implementing agency of PAR:  
 
[. . .] to successfully build a democratic, clean, strong, 
professional, modern, effective and efficient public 
administration system which operates in line with the principle 
of the socialist State ruled-by-law under the leadership of the 
Party; public cadres and civil servants will have appropriate 
skills and ethical qualities to respond to the requirements of the 
cause of nation building and development (Ministry of Home 
Affairs n.d.). 
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Weberisation and PAR: Seeing Like the Vietnamese Bureaucratic State   
 
What has deviated since the very beginning from donor's ideals for reform 
articulated in "good governance," the bureaucratic elite view administrative 
reforms in a context of steeped in cultural ideology that can be used to 
buttress traditional claims to political legitimacy. As Vietnamese rulers did 
in the past, drawing legitimacy by ensuring the country's national 
sovereignty and unity remains paramount to the present regime. If one looks 
beyond nationalism and patriotism, it is apparent that Vietnam's capitalist 
transformation made obsolete socialist economic institutions and 
corresponding class struggle rhetoric. As Fforde (2007: 22) argues, this has 
gradually narrowed the source from which the Leninist party-state has 
traditionally drawn a good deal of its political legitimacy that is located 
beyond revolutionary patriotism and nationalism. Striving for progress and 
modernity and promoting socio-economic development gained political 
weight instead (Vasavakul 1995). With the promulgation of Đổi mới, the 
party state has promised to make Vietnam's people "prosperous" and the 
nation "strong." Given the growing importance of such performance-based 
legitimacy, as Reis (2012: 161) argues, "the image of a rational 
administrative apparatus which serves the needs of the people is now 
playing a key role in legitimation of one-party rule."   
In aiming to preserve the political status quo of one-party rule, the 
bureaucratic elite is under pressure to seek out new claims to legitimacy that 
are sufficiently robust to withstand the gradual ideological demise of 
Leninism. Looking into the past has become part of the solution. The 
concept of a strong state and a weak civil society, which dates to before the 
Leninist state emerged as a product of anti-colonial struggle, is part of 
Vietnam's socio-cultural legacy and deeply entrenched in the Confucian 
worldview of how the state-society relationship should be organised. As 
Reis (2012) claims, the essence of the idea of the Vietnamese state is based 
on the rationale that the (one-party) state exists for the exclusive purpose of 
serving the people and common good. This rationale is apparent in Article 
Two of the Constitution (both 1992 and 2014 versions), which defines the 
Vietnamese state as a "socialist State ruled by law of the People, by the 
People and for the People." In spite of the significant ideological differences 
between Confucianism and Marxism-Leninism, these views are compatible 
with socialist ideology because they are useful for aligning with Confucian 
notions of state-society relations that have traditionally shaped Vietnam's 
political culture and concept of governance. The underlying idea, is one of a 
managerial and paternalistic state represented by a bureaucratic elite that 
draws its legitimacy to govern not from being democratically elected, but 
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from its wisdom, virtue and morality (Woodside 2006: 23). In this system, 
the state is the ultimate designer and promoter of development, while extra-
bureaucratic forces are perceived as redundant and disruptive of the 
paternalistic relationship between rulers and the ruled, potentially provoking 
social disharmony, unrest and chaos. It is a governance system in which the 
collective rules over individual interests and freedom (Minh Nhut Duong 
2004: 14–15; Pham Duy Nghia 2005: 80).  
Weberian bureaucracy as a rational instrument of governance 
increasingly has gained relevance with the need to revitalise past models for 
claiming legitimacy (Reis 2012: 161). Indeed, Woodside (2006), a historian, 
demonstrated how the rationalisation of state and administration emerged in 
conjunction with a merit-based bureaucracy in imperial China long before it 
did in Europe. The cradle of Vietnamese civilisation, the Red River Delta, 
was under Chinese domination for almost 1,000 years until 938 AD, which 
naturally led Chinese features to become entrenched in Vietnamese political 
and administrative culture. Originating in the Chinese model, Womack 
claims (2006) that the traditional Vietnamese royal administration draws on 
a centralised and strictly hierarchical state apparatus in which professional 
bureaucrats, formerly called mandarins, implement royal decrees and 
provided for bottom-up reporting in the form of numbers and statistics. In 
this system, unlike in feudal Europe, recruitment to state positions did not 
follow aristocratic principles of hereditary claims, but was based on civil 
service examinations which assessed the knowledge, skills, wisdom and 
virtue of applicants. Paternalistic, technocratic and meritocratic notions 
mingled to form a unique managerial state concept with an epistemic elite at 
its core. Thus, the righteousness required to govern derives from virtue and 
wisdom instead of election or birth right. It is a system in which political 
and epistemic power is accumulated in the hands of technocrats and 
knowledge-commanding professionals, who are in turn mandated to produce 
progress, increase social welfare and spur development on behalf of the 
collective (Woodside 2006: 18; Dao Minh Chau 1996: 51). Policy failures 
are not considered to be the result of unsound institutional arrangements or 
ineffective organisational structures, but rather are attributed to the poor 
qualifications of state officials in terms of knowledge, virtue and ethics.   
Incumbent political leaders, like the General Party Secretary Nguyễn 
Phú Trọng, have repeatedly referred to this notion when expressing their 
concerns about the ongoing moral decay among the state corpus, which is 
ostensibly driven by ignorance in conjunction with the corrupt and selfish 
behaviour of officials (Tuổi Trẻ 27 December 2011). As expressed by the 
political leadership, increasing government performance significantly is a 
matter of improving the quality of bureaucrats; to a lesser extent, it depends 
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on the quality of organisational and structural arrangements; and in no case 
does it require changing the entire political system (Dao Minh Chau 1996: 
51–53; Woodside 2006: 18–26). The foremost goal, or so-called 
"remandarinisation," as Woodside argues (2006), has been unfolding since 
the 1990s alongside a cultural renaissance of Neo-Confucian values and 
stimulated by the bureaucratic elite attentions to replace the increasingly 
outdated Leninist ideology with "something like a higher moral authority of 
democratic kind without all the risks of political democracy" (Woodside 
2006: 84). It thus was not by coincidence that, in the 1990s, civil service 
examination was reintroduced with the hope that it would "supply the 
country with a new mystique of public service" (84). In 2011, Prime 
Minister Nguyễn Tấn Dũng declared that, by 2015, the number of civil 
servants and cadres in leadership positions would number 200,000, of which 
120,000 should hold bachelor, master and PhD degrees (Tuổi Trẻ 26 July 
2011). Although party membership remains the most indispensable tool for 
advancing one's career in the civil service, holding academic degrees has 
become just as important in light of Vietnam's meritocratic turn away from 
purely socialist ideology and class struggle rhetoric.   
Although different interpretations of public service reform persist, 
there is, nevertheless, a broad consensus among donors and the Vietnamese 
government about the necessity of reform. Weberisation and the 
corresponding institutional interventions made to propel change have gained 
momentum over the past three decades of Renovation Policy, leading to the 
country's capitalist transformation, ideological shift towards "good 
governance" and meritocratic turn. Reaching beyond policy formulation and 
declarations of commitment, the next two sections critically deal with the 
extent to which formal institutional interventions actually materialise in day-
to-day practice.    
 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS AND THE CHANGING  
PATTERNS OF PARKINSONISATION  
 
Scratching the Surface of Reform: Downsizing and Streamlining  
the State Machinery  
 
As outlined earlier, the key objectives of PAR were to rationalise 
organisational structures, streamline the state machinery, downsize staff and 
promote state retreat, all of which were aimed at enhancing administrative 
performance. To which extent these objective were achieved is questionable 
in light of the contradictory scenario described in the introduction. 
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Historically, an enormous growth in bureaucratic structures coincided with 
the socialist takeover in 1954 in the North, and 1975 in the South. 
Centralised economic planning coupled with mono-organisational socialism 
provided conditions conducive for the state machinery to gradually expand 
in terms of its mandate, organisational complexity and personnel (Porter 
1993; Thayer 1995). In the pre-reform era, Parkinsonisation was at the core 
of the evolution of a highly complex, inflated and all-pervasive bureaucratic 
apparatus consisting of countless state management units, party organs, 
mass organisations, and state enterprises, all of which were, and still are, 
intertwined in many respects. In effect, Orwellisation in the guise of 
Leninism constantly propelled state fattening. It was in the 1980s, on the 
eve of Đổi mới, that this trajectory reached its apogee with an all-time 
record of 37 ministries and ministerial-adequate agencies (see Chart 1). 
   
 
 
Chart 1:  Number of ministries and ministerial-level agencies from 1955 to 2011 (source: 
Data according to Koh et al. 2009: 9 and Vietnam GSO). 
                    
After Renovation was formally adopted, the number of ministries and 
ministerial-agencies gradually declined to 22 by 2011. State retreat, 
economic decentralisation, socialisation and other reform policies adopted 
to restructure the state machinery compelled the numerical reduction in 
ministries. This, first and foremost, was brought about by ministerial 
mergers aiming to reorganise administrative organisation by strengthening 
sectoral integration, improving workflows, reducing costs and lessening 
administrative fragmentation. From the central level, reforms then trickled 
down to sub-national levels. From 2002 to 2011, the number of provincial 
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departments per province decreased from 27 to 20. Subsequent 
restructurings at subordinate levels caused the number of district offices 
drop correspondingly
15
 (Saigon Times 23 April 2011). From this, one could 
conclude that PAR was highly efficient, as it obviously reduced and 
streamlined the state machinery. However, when comparing with data on 
the number of state officials, as summarised in Chart 2, it becomes 
questionable whether PAR had a substantive effect on the ground. 
Recruitment into public service (to the state and party), has, in fact, 
increased rather than decreased. Indeed, the data indicate that irrespective of 
the numerical decrease in state agencies, both at central and local levels, the 
number of state officials now working (in fewer ministries and provincial 
departments) was constantly rising. To illustrate, the number of state 
officials doubled from approximately 300,000 to almost 600,000 from 2000 
to 2007. That this happened in spite of the implementation of PAR poses 
questions about how one should make sense of PAR, particularly its goal of 
staff downsizing.   
Breaking apart the actual developments that occurred within 
organisational structures during PAR implementation provides some 
clarification. For example, what is noteworthy is that the increase in state 
personnel was unevenly distributed across the national level and sub-
national tiers of the apparatus. At the national level, although the number of 
ministries and ministerial-level agencies declined by about 40 percent, the 
amount of central-state officials, in contrast, remained relatively stable (see 
Chart 2). This suggests that the bulk of growth in state personnel occurred at 
sub-national levels, where the number of state officials rose four-fold from 
1995 to 2007. Analysing this further, the next section looks separately at 
central and sub-national level developments. 
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Chart 2: Numerical development of state personnel in Vietnam (source: Vietnam GSO, 
statistical yearbooks).  
 
Digging deeper into reforms: Bureaucratic involution and  
the exploration of complexity  
 
Although an unlikely inspiration, Geertz's (1963) "agricultural involution 
model" provides a helpful conceptual gateway for contextualising the 
peculiarities of Parkinsonisation in the central tier of the Vietnamese state 
machinery. In his anthropological study of socio-ecological change on Java 
under Dutch colonial rule, Geertz documents that when exposed to massive 
outside pressure, a social system that is no longer capable of expanding will 
most likely respond with inward development. In other words, if expansion 
as a first choice is unattainable, a system copes by moving deeper into 
already existing structures.
16
 He denotes such inward-oriented development 
"involution" in reference to the process of increasing complexity in existing 
social and organisational structures. Borrowing from Geertz, if we take 
bureaucracy as the social system of organisation, then PAR is the source of 
outside pressure. Facing limitations to expansion due to PAR, 
Parkinsonisation either ceases or manifests in alternative pathways that are 
less conspicuous and detectable. Indeed, Parkinsonisation shifts track to 
bypass reforms by switching from expansion to involution. As illustrated in 
the following cases examining ministerial mergers, it does indeed become 
apparent that the organisational structures of ministries did not further 
expand, but instead submerged deeper into pre-existing structures.   
From 1992 to 2011, Koh et al. (2009: 10–11) documented a total of 
16 mergers between ministries and ministerial-equivalent agencies, each 
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involving two to five central government agencies to be fused. In 1995, for 
instance, the Ministry of Industry was established by merging the Ministry 
of Energy, the Ministry of Light Industry and the Ministry of Heavy 
Industry. Later on, in 2007, the Ministry of Industry was then merged with 
the Ministry of Trade to give birth to the new Ministry of Industry and 
Trade. In the same vein, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 
(MARD) came to life in 1995 when the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Foodstuff, the Ministry of Forestry and the Ministry of Water were merged. 
In 2008, MARD further absorbed the Ministry of Fisheries, now 
encompassing four former ministries in one super ministry.     
Such mergers appeared, at first, to contribute to the streamlining of 
organisational structures, perhaps even simplifying administrative 
procedures and enhancing cross-sectoral coordination. Nevertheless, it 
remains unclear to what extent organisational arrangements within these 
new ministries have truly changed as a result of ministerial mergers. Also 
unclear is what happened to the respective personnel from each ministry. 
Looking into the internal organisation of merged ministries reveals that a 
great deal of the administrative structures have not changed at all. Rather, 
despite their loss of autonomy as a discrete ministry, many of the old 
ministries preserved their former organisational shape when put under the 
umbrella of the new ministry, thereby creating the impression of integration. 
"Downgrading" is another process through which ministries preserved the 
organisational structure of their departments: former ministerial departments 
became sub-departments and, likewise, former sub-departments turned into 
even smaller units. Unsurprisingly, the number of associated personnel 
remained unchanged, partly even increased. Critically reflecting on PAR, 
the following quote found in a Vietnamese newspaper underpins the 
assumption that PAR triggered involution rather than encouraged 
substantive streamlining of the state apparatus:   
 
[…] despite the reduction of ministries [bộ] and line-agencies 
[ngành], the state apparatus actually has further fattened since 
the number of sub-divisions within existing agencies has been 
growing constantly, specifically due to the trend in establishing 
new sub-divisions [vụ] and the renaming of sub-divisions [vụ] 
into general offices [tổng cục] and departments [cục] under 
ministries and ministerial-equivalent agencies. In the last tenure 
of government [2007–2011], the number of general offices 
[tổng cục] in national agencies, and likewise, the number of 
respective units at local levels increased by 100 percent (the 
previous period of government was 21, this period is 40). 
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Furthermore, the number of ministerial departments [cục] 
increased from 82 to 103 over the same time (Saigon Times 23 
April 2011, translation by author).
 
 
 
Given this reorientation from expansion to involution, it appears that PAR 
has had little effect on Parkinsonisation because organisation expansions 
was simply re-directed into pre-existing organisational structures, where it 
was able to evolve more subtly and silently. Chart 3 portrays this trajectory 
as consecutive sequences of bureaucratic involution.   
 
 
Chart 3: Sequences of bureaucratic involution (source: author). 
 
Out of Control: Bureaucratic Expansion and Administrative 
Fragmentation 
 
Structural changes at the central level were followed by comparable 
measures taken at sub-national scales, namely in the provinces, districts and 
communes. One result of the various sequences of involution is that new 
opportunities for entering state service were generated and the possibility 
for promotion grew. Drawing on bureaucratic involution alone, however, 
would fall too short of explaining the immense numerical growth in state 
officials at sub-national levels over the past 10 years. Apparently, other even 
more pervasive forces were at work to fuel growth at sub-national scales, as 
illustrated in the following analysis.  
Since the socialist state came into being, administrative boundaries, 
whether provincial, district or commune, have been in a constant state of 
flux. In 2013, Vietnam administratively consisted of 64 provinces and 
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cities.
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 35 years earlier, in 1978 (two years after the North and South 
reunited), the country comprised merely 38 provinces (Kerkvliet 2004: 5). 
This process of re-drawing boundaries reached an apogee in the 1990s, 
when more than 13 provinces were split up within a single decade. Thayer 
(1995: 55), analysing these changes, argued that the fear of losing control 
over powerful provinces caused Hanoi to break them into smaller units. 
Whether this interpretation holds true, or the increase of provinces is better 
ascribed to Parkinsonisation, is difficult to tell. However, there is no doubt 
that the apparatus and its administrative landscape has become fragmented 
over the past decades, leaving behind an immense administrative patchwork. 
Similar tendencies are observable at the district scale, where the 
rearrangement of administrative boundaries raised the number of districts 
from 600 in 1997 up to 689 in 2011. This corresponds to a 16 percent 
increase in 14 years. At the commune level, the lowest administrative scale, 
the number of units increased by seven percentfrom 10,331 to 11,121 
communes over the same time period.
18
 Each time an administrative unit is 
split, additional state agencies, party organs and mass organisations come to 
life, and along with this come staff transfers, promotion opportunities into 
higher positions and the recruitment of fresh staff to occupy vacant or newly 
created positions. Considering only the provinces that have been established 
since 1978, this accounts for 25 new provincial People's Committees, 25 
Departments of Finance, 25 Departments of Trade and Industry, 25 
Departments of Agriculture and Rural Development, 25 
provincial/municipal Party Committees, 25 provincial/municipal Famer's 
Unions, 25 Women's Unions, to name but a few organisations.    
Given the fact the Vietnam's population increased from 50 to almost 
90 million over the same time, one could ascribe this process of sub-division 
to demographic changes. In this perspective, the state grew in order to keep 
step with the provision of public services to its citizens. When and under 
what conditions administrative units are rearranged is defined by a set of 
government regulations. These regulations are based on criteria, such as 
socio-economic development indicators, population density, ethnic 
composition and land size of jurisdictions, coupled with topographic and 
geographic parameters for different regions of the country, such as 
highlands, deltas or coastal plains. Moreover, the urban and rural divide also 
plays a role (Government of Vietnam 2007). Decisions over whether to sub-
divide, nevertheless, are not necessarily bound to these regulations:  
 
Instead of merging administrative units, localities strive to split 
up. This is fuelling the steady growth and expansion of 
administrative entities in terms of numbers […] in some areas, 
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the local population is declining due to migration into urban 
areas, local governments still opt for establishing new 
administrative entities instead of merging them (Saigon Times 
23 April 2011, translation by author). 
 
This quote critically hints at arbitrariness of restructuring measures. 
Merging and splitting administrative units, apparently, is not necessarily a 
matter of scientific evidence-based decision making. Rather, as the author 
would argue, it is the result of an uncontrolled, self-dynamic process that 
lies beyond the regulatory power of the centralised state. Around the turn of 
the millennium, Koh (2001) pointed to various weaknesses of the central 
state, while Pike (2000) and Thayer (1995) highlighted the informally 
decentralised nature of Vietnam's bureaucratic apparatus. More recently, 
decentralisation policies, many of which are linked to PAR, have relocated 
power over administrative arrangements and personnel issues to the 
provincial authorities (Fritzen 2006), while monitoring and control 
mechanisms, both within and outside the state apparatus, have remained 
absent or dysfunctional. Consequently, bureaucratic expansion often 
managed to remain unnoticed and beyond the reach of development 
agencies and central state bodies in Hanoi that were overseeing the reform 
process. As a result, instead of streamlining the state machinery and 
rationalising workflows, the continuous fragmentation and sub-division of 
administrative landscapes has brought about just the opposite. With a 
constantly growing number of administrative units involved in any kind of 
planning, decision-making, and policy implementation, the coordination of 
activities has become more complex and disordered. This, for instance, is 
manifested in the management of natural resources, such as land and water, 
or infrastructure development, where instead of pooling forces and 
resources to make use of synergies and potentials, local planning remains 
isolated and fragmented (Waibel 2010: 17–18).   
 
Self-management as Bureaucratic Routine: Creating  
(Unnecessary) Work for Each Other 
 
Creating unnecessary work for each other is, as outlined earlier, a major 
driver of Parkinsonisation. Vietnam is no exception in this sense. Despite 
the formal departure from central planning more than two decades ago, 
statism and bureaucratic managerialism have largely prevailed as key 
features in post-Renovation Vietnam. Now as then, exhaustive planning 
procedures drawing on bottom-up reporting (báo cáo) coupled with rigid 
top-down implementation lie at the heart of what constitutes the 
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bureaucratic work routine in Vietnam. Formally, state-directed planning is a 
key element for the managerial-paternalistic regime to claim political 
legitimacy. Planning is omnipresent and the planning agenda gradually has 
extended with each new problem emerging in public discourse and, 
eventually, being absorbed by the managerial state.
19
 There is abundance of 
planning documents including long-term plans (quy hoạch), such as master 
plans and 10-year sectoral plans, as well as short term plans covering 
periods of five years and annual plans (kế hoạch). Closely connected to this 
phenomenon is the bureaucratic legacy of what previously was called the 
"application and grant"
20
 mechanism. Although formally removed, vestiges 
of this process persist in rigid state planning, budgeting and (top-down) 
resource allocation. Apart from directives, plans, strategies, circulars and 
reports moving back and forth within the apparatus, meetings and 
workshops, and an increasing number of steering boards (ban chỉ đạo) also 
act as major interfaces through which communication is conducted between 
state management agencies, party organs, mass organisations, research 
facilities, security forces and other branches of the party state.  
Against this background, it is not surprising that the growing number 
of administrative units and state agencies creates additional work in the 
form of reports, planning documents, meetings and workshops and that this 
owes to the ever-increasing complexity of organisational structures, 
reporting mechanisms and a growing number of planning procedures that 
need to be linked up with each other. Hence, bureaucratic expansion and 
involution in tandem have contributed greatly to the numerical explosion of 
governmental meetings, workshops and to the exhaustive reporting and 
planning culture. In 2008, a series of articles in a national newspaper 
investigated the phenomenon: 
 
According to the Department of Construction of Ho Chi Minh 
City, the department has received 814 invitation letters to 
meetings at ministerial as well as municipal level, as well as to 
state management departments at the district level during the 
first six months of the year [2008]. Half of these invitation 
letters came from the city's administration. In the meantime, the 
department itself has issued not less than 455 invitations to 
other state management agencies at the district level for joint 
meetings. Hence, the Ho Chi Minh City Department of 
Construction had to attend a total of 1,270 meetings within six 
months. This would be 10 meetings per day on average, not 
including the department internal meetings (Tuổi Trẻ 4 August 
2008, translation by author). 
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State bureaucrats, specifically senior staff, are heavily burdened by the 
attendance at meetings and workshops, which according to the newspaper 
investigation accounts for 70 to 80 percent of their weekly working hours 
(Tuổi Trẻ 4 August 2008). In this sense, the managerial bureaucracy appears 
to be largely occupied with managing itself. Whether at the national or sub-
national level, such bureaucratic meeting marathons are being organised 
daily, and are indicative of the Weberian rationality of state management, 
policy making and development planning. The communication typical for 
these kind of events, however, is somewhat vague, superficial and 
ambiguous, fraught with "empty signifiers" and "stereotypical phrases," as 
MacLean documented (2013: 187). Reports and plans, whether written or 
orally presented, score poorly in terms of contents. There is a lack of precise 
evaluation of what has been done, while statements of what will be done 
next remain vague. Plans and reports appear to be mere rhetorical exercises 
aiming to produce images of commitment and responsiveness by drawing 
on mobilising metaphors and truisms formed around terms such as renovate 
(đổi mới), reform (cải cách), overcome (khắc phục), modernise (hiện đại 
hóa), drastic solutions (giải pháp quyết liệt), decisive action (quyết tâm 
hánh động), increase (tăng lên), serving the people (phục vụ nhân dân), just 
to mention a few of the most common. Planning and reporting are ends in 
themselves. Ultimately, it is the process that counts, not the outcome. 
Therefore, meetings and workshops within the apparatus are best taken as a 
ritualised enactment with bureaucrats as the protagonist and government 
premises as the stage. This is, as Reis (2012: 161) claims, the formal sphere 
of Vietnam's bureaucratic state, in which images of merit-based officialdom 
aim to exhibit an aura of rational administration in the Weberian sense—a 
bureaucracy that only exists to serve the people. Looking backstage, 
however, reveals a very different picture, as the next section will elucidate.   
 
 
BEYOND IMAGES OF WEBERISATION: CULTURAL IDEOLOGY, 
STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION  
    
The Persistence of Informal Institutions: Cultural Ideology of 
Patronage and Cronyism   
 
How the state would like to be seen, as both Gainsborough (2005: 16) and 
Reis (2012: 161) have depicted in Vietnam, does not necessarily coincide 
with what bureaucrats actually do and how they behave. As will be shown 
in this section, which is concerned with everyday administrative culture and 
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bureaucratic behaviour, social and moral institutions rooted in traditional 
culture, norms and values have largely undermined and hollowed out formal 
institutional interventions made in the context of PAR.  
Although Weberian-style bureaucracy in the sense of rational 
administration has existed in Vietnam far longer than in Europe, 
traditionally administration and politics have been pervaded by informality 
and systems of patronage. Adages are plentiful in the Vietnamese language. 
The idiom, "If one becomes a mandarin, the whole lineage asks for 
favours"
21
 is perhaps the most prominent one hinting at cronyism and 
favouritism inherent in the country's political and administrative culture, 
both past and present. Commonly referred to as an umbrella (ô du) in 
Vietnamese, informal institutions forming around favouritism, cronyism and 
patronage have traditionally shaped social structures and the way people 
interact with each other. As Pike (2000: 273) claims, people in Vietnam 
have a strong faith in the power and rightness of personalised networks as a 
means of coping with problems and gaining opportunity. Such informal 
institutions are governed by mutual trust, a moral commitment based on 
(equal) taking and giving (Gillespie 2001; Beresford 2008: 234), many of 
which last from cradle to grave. State officials and cadres are subject to 
them just as anybody else in society. The following quote by Gainsborough 
captures what is conceived as morally right behaviour, an attitude that 
fundamentally differs from Weberian ideals of bureaucracy as formulated in 
PAR:  
 
In relation to the tendency to pay attention to servicing one's 
patronage network rather than working for some notion of the 
public good, the argument is that in the Vietnamese system, 
looking after those in your immediate circle or patronage 
network is regarded as the culturally right thing to do. In fact, 
not to do so, would be viewed as behaving badly 
(Gainsborough et al. 2009: 380). 
 
Disproportionately powerful, and saturated by socio-cultural norms and 
values, informal institutions reign supreme over any formal institution 
enshrined in laws, regulations and policies. The Vietnamese government 
and its international development partners, however, seem blind to these 
social realities when assessing the challenges to PAR. After all, in the 
mainstream development policy discourse, as illustrated by Ferguson long 
time ago (1994), bureaucracy is still mistaken for a neutral, unitary and 
effective machine bound to laws and the strict implementation of policies 
and plans, and governed by no other interest except for serving the public 
IJAPS, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1–40, 2016   Simon Benedikter 
27 
 
good. By entirely depoliticising reforms, policy implementation gaps are 
then blamed on formal institutional weaknesses such as improper law 
enforcement, lack of financial resources, poor organisation and the lack of 
capacity within the state apparatus. These, however, are not the actual root 
causes of sluggish reform, but merely represent the symptoms of something 
more deeply ingrained in informal institutions. More training, better laws 
and improved organisational arrangements, which are usually prescribed by 
development partners in consensus with the Vietnamese government, are 
unlikely to be effective measures for strengthening formal institutions if the 
limited potential to unfold in their cultural environment is not addressed.  
 
Behind Potemkin Walls, or Under Opaque Umbrellas  
 
The promotion of merit-based civil service provides an illustrative case of 
the limitations of overly formal interventions. In general, despite having 
created rules, regulations and procedures to guide examination-based 
recruitment and promotion, career prospects have largely remained subject 
to the primacy of informal institutions. Diverging from what is stipulated in 
the Law on Civil Servants,
22
 vacant positions are rarely announced publicly 
and recruitment modes are neither open nor transparent, let alone 
competitive. In the absence of clear job requirements, what counts most are 
personalised relations and the amount of money one is willing to invest in 
purchasing a chair (Gainsborough 2005: 27).
23
 For the time being, there is 
little evidence that formal requirement of professional qualifications has 
been successful in doing away with informal practices and the underlying 
cultural ideology of patronage and cronyism (Poon et al. 2009: 217; Bauer 
2011: 55). For applicants ineligible on the basis of merit, there are many 
means of bargaining for one's place, many of which border on deception. 
"In-service" university programmes,
24
 hiring ghost-writers for completing a 
thesis, or the outright purchase or counterfeit of university degrees have 
become parts of the solution (Tuổi Trẻ 27 June 2011). Dubious PhDs earned 
in less than a year, academic titles from abroad without knowing a word of 
foreign language, or whole cohorts of commune cadres with faked high 
school degrees are only some of countless anecdotes commonplace in 
Vietnam's meritocratic turn (Tuổi Trẻ 20 April 2009, 8 June 2011, 26 July 
2010, 28 July 2010). Adding to this, Pike (2000: 276) points to the 
exclusivity of government organisations and the narrow scope of 
recruitment, in which those in control tend to recruit from their own ranks. 
This is compounded by the trend that access to state service has become 
somewhat locked up due to declining social mobility (Benedikter 2014: 
138). Apart from the moral duties towards their own networks, maintaining 
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and diversifying one's patronage systems are vital ingredients for an 
advanced career in state service. They enlarge one's power base, help to 
move up the ladder, and provide protection against rivals and hostile 
networks (Gainsborough 2007). Each time a new department is founded or 
an administrative unit is split, informal networks are activated in order to fill 
new space through promotion and additional staff recruitment. Against this 
backdrop, policies designed to streamline the apparatus, which invariably 
suggest staff dismissals, are condemned to fail as long as the whole 
apparatus is pervaded by a web of personalised relations based on 
reciprocity. No superior would ever be willing, or even be morally able, to 
dismiss subordinates to whom he or she is bound by any form of kinship, 
cronyism and patronage. Moreover, it would be rather difficult, if not 
impossible, because dismissing subordinates who invested considerable 
amounts of private assets for their own recruitment or promotion would be 
reluctant to lose chair they are sitting on.   
Collectively driven, bureaucratic involution has provided a way out of 
the dilemma. Staff do not permanently need to drop out of the system; they 
can be kept on by shifting them back and forth until new and suitable 
positions are found or created deliberately. Said differently, unnecessary 
work is constantly created in order to maintain and create new departments 
and administrative units. Over coffee, the director of a provincial state 
agency said that about half of his staff is incapable of performing their 
actual tasks due to insufficient or mismatched qualifications. Without any 
assignments that they can accomplish, such workers' sense of duty is 
narrowed to their physical presence at the workstation, rather than their 
performance. Nevertheless, as the director explained, there is nothing he 
could do about this because replacing them with others is infeasible, 
because higher approval would be needed by those who had placed them 
there for good reasons.
25
 While employed as an advisor in a ministerial 
agency in Hanoi,
26
 the author made similar observations. The department in 
which the author worked comprised nine staff, each of which, according to 
the department's formal delineation, was ascribed a certain field of expertise 
that came with clear responsibilities. Apart from sitting in workshops and 
conferences, most of which were sponsored by donors, the department as a 
whole was largely dormant. Behind the Potemkin walls of bureaucratic 
effectiveness, most of the staff spent their office hours in leisure, reading 
novels, surfing the internet, chatting, drinking coffee or simply sleeping, 
albeit with a remarkably high sense of discipline in terms of sticking to 
prescribed office hours. In sharp contrast to this everyday reality, the 
frequent documentation and reporting by the department drew the opposite 
picture. On paper, every single staff member was performing multiple tasks 
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on various projects that were both nationally and internationally sponsored. 
The language deployed in these reports was broad, fuzzy and vague. 
Although details on activities and results achieved were not forthcoming, 
the department was reportedly described as swamped with work and 
chronically understaffed. Deliberate misreporting aimed to bulk up funding 
to enable the recruitment of additional staff to deal with growing amounts of 
illusionary work. This situation was well known, but understood as 
somewhat normal throughout the agency. Most department staff were said 
to maintain personal ties to the directors, both of whom originate from the 
same province and spent considerable time studying together in Eastern 
Europe during the socialist era. Recruitment followed kinship or, more 
indirectly, patronage, the latter becoming important when considering the 
appointment or advancement of siblings and other relatives of high-ranking 
ministerial officials to whom the directors were bound to for their own 
career.
27
 Speaking to consequences of these phenomena, a recent evaluation 
estimated that the proportion of redundant and unproductive workers who 
were employed just to sit under their "umbrellas" without performing any 
actual tasks accounted for 30 percent of the entire civil service, with another 
50 percent considered unqualified (Tuổi Trẻ 7 November 2014).  
 
Self-serving Interests and Modes of Appropriation  
 
In pre-Renovation Vietnam, embarking on a career as a cadre, whether in a 
state-owned business or administration, was desirable as it provided benefits 
such as lifetime job security, a stable income, social prestige and many 
means of accumulating wealth (Porter 1993: 62). This impression still holds 
true today although current remuneration schemes have fallen far behind the 
reality of living standards (Painter 2006: 337). Salaries in public service lag 
far behind what would actually be needed to make a living for oneself, let 
alone a whole family.
28
 Recent attempts to adjust the public salary system 
have been counteracted by high inflation, rising consumer prices and, above 
all, an ever increasing number of individuals on the government's payroll (a 
consequence of Parkinsonisation). Patronage and cronyism in conjunction 
with inadequate payment is perhaps the main driver of Parkinsonisation 
because new state positions can still be financed cheaply out of state coffers. 
In response to chronic underpayment, it is somewhat normal for state 
officials to minimally attend to their duties, while devoting much more 
energy and time to generating additional income. Since the one-party state 
came into being, the necessity of informal income generation among state 
officials has steadily become institutionalised; it is now largely taken for 
granted and societally accepted. Found within the complicated patchwork of 
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income sources, in which the official salary only accounts for a fraction of 
monthly earnings, bureaucrats have collectively created and institutionalised 
remuneration schemes that often draw on patronage networks and cronyism 
(Painter 2006). This includes a range of supplements such as allowances, 
per diems and other bonus payments, as well as sources more informal in 
nature, which can be collectively and individually appropriated. The 
enormous number of meetings and workshops, most of which remain 
rhetorical exercises without any concrete outcomes, make sense in this light, 
as they function as a means for allocating state funds and ODA
29
 among 
members of the bureaucracy. It turns out that coming together for countless 
meetings is by no means irrational and ineffective. What counts here, 
however, is only to a lesser extent the precise outcome, and to a larger 
extent the mere implementation as an end in itself that allows for 
redistribution and accumulation through sitting allowances, travel expenses 
and money redirected through irregular accounting procedures (Tuổi Trẻ 5 
August 2008).  
In addition to this, and certainly more critical nowadays, are the 
multiple forms of systemic corruption and other rent-seeking behaviours 
that have increased in intensity and complexity along with the country's 
capitalist transformation. The margins available through informal 
appropriation typically fall behind basic needs and expectations. Civil 
servants, especially those in higher positions, consider themselves middle 
and upper class, obliged to pursue corresponding lifestyles and material 
consumption, often including aspirations for modern housing, cars, 
expensive smartphones and other commodities that are actually 
unaffordable with official salaries.
30
 To deal with this dilemma, the 
transition from state to market has fostered a new commercial culture of 
administration that is virtually without limitations in terms of the ingenuity 
of bureaucrats and their "umbrellas" to capitalise on their authority in order 
to generate private income. Running private firms under the names of 
relatives and straw men, renting out public property for personal gain, land 
grabbing in the context of fuzzy property regimes, collecting informal 
levies, capitalising on insider information, or collecting kickbacks are only 
some of many means of privatising the assets of holding a public office 
(Painter 2006: 335–336). As a consequence, decision making in policy and 
planning is not necessarily governed by Weberian rationality, but often by 
self-serving aspirations embedded in collective action. Boundaries between 
public office and private interests have become deliberately blurred due to 
the myriad of new possibilities for wealth accumulation brought about by 
the market (Greenfield 1993; Gainsborough 2003). The aforementioned 
construction boom of public buildings and infrastructure need to be 
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understood in this light, namely driven by the nexus of bureaucratic 
business interests, crony capitalism, corruption and bid-rigging, which reign 
supreme in the soaring public investment sector (Benedikter 2014: 183–
265). With no clear distinction between what is public and what is private, 
the "office has not been kept separate from the person" (Painter 2006: 13 
cited in Gainsborough 2005: 13). Consequently, the way the civil service 
behaves contradicts the image of the bureaucracy that it wishes to produce. 
Calling the events of the past decades a "meritocratic turn" or "good 
governance," is merely playing out scripts from PAR and Weberisation in 
order to distract from backstage realities.  
 
 
CONCLUSION: RETHINKING BUREAUCRACY AND REFORMS   
 
This paper critically reflected on administrative reforms and the nature of 
bureaucracy in Vietnam through a sociological approach to institutional 
interventions. Analytically, this proceeded by looking at different 
trajectories of bureaucratisation, namely Weberisation, Parkinsonisation and 
Orwellisation, consulted for tracing reform outputs and change. It was 
illustrated that the combination of Orwellisation and Parkinsonisation 
prevailed after Vietnam's Leninist state came into being, and Weberisation 
gained relevance only in the wake of Renovation Policy (Đổi mới)more 
specifically due to the necessity of administrative and public service 
reforms. Behind the imperative of creating rational and efficient structures 
of administration and governance, and promoting accountability, donors and 
Vietnam's bureaucratic elite comprehend differently the broader prospects 
of PAR. For the international donor community, PAR has become an 
instrument for directing Vietnam towards Western-dominated, normative 
"good governance" rationales and more economic deregulation, while 
Vietnam's bureaucratic elite increasingly understands PAR, and 
Weberisation as a cultural impetus to revitalise Neo-Confucian values 
expressing in meritocratic concepts of rule. The latter has become the new 
locus for developing alternative modes of claiming political legitimacy in 
the post-socialist era of transition towards more performance-based 
legitimacy and meritocratic style of administration. However, regardless of 
these different perceptions, ultimately, the Weberisation brought about by 
PAR and the respective institutional interventions have remained an illusory 
phenomenona paper tiger with little potential to unfold in real life despite 
continued capacity building, training and improved regulatory frameworks. 
To phrase this more drastically: PAR predominantly helps the superficial 
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image of the managerial state and its meritocratic bureaucracy to sustain the 
current political regime and social order. Beyond this formal sphere, 
however, Parkinsonisation and Orwellisation prevail as key features shaping 
bureaucratisation within Vietnam's enduring authoritarian and unicentric 
system of governance.  
  Since the very beginning of reform policy, Weberisation has merely 
existed as a vision or ideal, one which is continuously captured and 
hollowed out by the power and societal supremacy of informal institutions 
embedded in cultural ideologies, traditional values and norms. The 
traditional commitment of state officials to moral and cultural institutions 
forming around kinship, cronyism and patronage clashes fundamentally 
with notions of a merit-based bureaucracy featuring personal accountability, 
transparency and competitive promotion/recruitment. Going one step 
further, decision-making within the state machinery has come to be less 
about legal-rational analysis and scientific-rational procedures, and more 
about how to best sustain and serve patronage networks. The result is an 
administrative culture that barely distinguishes between public office and 
private life, which is, in fact, one of the key prerequisites in Weberian 
bureaucracy. Nevertheless, this does not imply irrationality, but rather 
demands a change in perspective to one that is able to see rationality and 
goal-orientation in the Vietnamese socio-cultural context of bureaucracy. 
Overstaffing, low salaries in public service, departmentalism, administrative 
sub-division, bureaucratic expansion, increasing organisational complexity, 
and an inflated meeting culture are, by this token, not symptoms of 
inefficiency, but rather point at a view of efficiency based on its own 
rationality and goal-orientation. Hence, the countless workshops and 
meetings, in the first place, serve the redistribution of material resources, 
and second, the creation of images of Weberian bureaucracy committed to 
rational policy making and development planning. This is a rationality that 
well serves the collective interests of the bureaucratic polity, a strategic-
group pervaded by informal arrangements that collectively strive for 
appropriating, monopolising and redistributing scarce resources in a society 
with limited opportunities. Therefore, a bureaucracy that is often termed 
sluggish, slow and complex could, in its own terms, can also be described as 
innovative and creative, if one of the actual goals is organisational 
expansion and growth. Unsurprisingly, hence, it is Parkinsonisation that 
stands out most prominently in Vietnam's post-Renovation process of 
bureaucratisation. As documented in this paper, the past 20 years have, in 
spite of PAR, witnessed the increasing complexity of state structures, 
fattening of the bureaucracy and muddling of administrative procedures. 
Compounded by the present economic difficulties, this tendency is likely to 
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continue as long as official salaries in public office remain so low that 
absorbing additional staff is not a question of cost. Although formal 
criticism is sometimes expressed by politicians and the media, fragmenting 
the state apparatus is not necessarily perceived a bad thing, but rather as 
something morally justified, as it provides jobs, social security and 
opportunities to fulfil societal commitments and serve one's patronage 
network. Continuous recruitment and the accumulation of administrative 
authority and power, which can be capitalised for generating private income 
to augment low official salaries, allows the pie to be continually split, 
thereby feeding an ever enlarging cohort of state officials. If one considers 
bureaucracy a social-cultural phenomenon, resistance to public service 
reforms stems from the persistence of informal institutions based on 
routines, behaviours, norms, values and worldviews that do not match the 
principles embedded in "good governance" nor Weberian bureaucracy as 
anchored in Western-dominated development paradigms and policy models. 
Orwellisation, sustained by enduring one-party authoritarianism, provides 
the social order under which the civil service, as a strategic group, finds the 
best conditions for appropriating resources and expanding in terms of power 
and the number of followers. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
*
  Since 2014, Simon Benedikter works as a researcher and adviser in the field of 
environmental change and natural resources governance in Hanoi, Vietnam. Prior to 
that (2007–2013), he served as a senior researcher at the Center for Development 
Research (ZEF), University of Bonn, Germany. Being based in the Vietnamese 
Mekong Delta during that time, he was engaged in a wide range of social science 
research activities on water governance, rural development and environmental issues. 
He holds a Diploma in Southeast Asian Studies and a PhD in Development Studies, 
both from Bonn University. He is the author of the book The Vietnamese Hydrocracy 
and the Mekong Delta: Water Resources Development from State Socialism to 
Bureaucratic Capitalism (2014). His current research interests are concerned with the 
political and social dimension of ecological change and critical development studies 
focusing on Vietnam.    
1
  Kinh tế thị trường định hướng xã hội chủ nghĩa. 
2
  Đổi mới was promulgated during the VI Congress of the VCP in 1986 in response to a 
severe economic and political crisis facing Vietnam in the 1980s caused by the 
failures of central planning, increased international isolation and dwindling support by 
the Soviet Union.  
3
  This term is borrowed from Porter's (1993) analysis of Vietnam's regime in the 1990s. 
4
  In the countryside, where the bulk of Vietnam's population lives, livelihoods, directly 
or indirectly, remain reliant on agriculture, forestry and fishery. Non-farm businesses 
sufficiently large to stimulate labour markets, the bulk of which are either state-owned 
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or foreign-owned, are limited to metropolitan areas. Domestic private business, in 
comparison, which includes establishments in rural areas, essentially consists of 
subsistence-oriented enterprisesmostly self-run or family-run micro enterprises 
with little effect on additional job creation (World Bank 2005; Benedikter et al. 2013; 
World Bank 2013: 35). 
5
  Annual GDP growth remained above nine percent in the mid-1990s but, since 2008, 
has dropped to about five percent (data according to IMF and ADB). According to 
Vietnam's Central Institute of Economic Management (CIEM), with 5.98 percent 
GDP growth in 2014, Vietnam came last in the Greater Mekong Subregion (Tuổi Trẻ 
12 February 2015).   
6
  Regarding the enduring economic crisis and its political implications on the one-party 
regime, see Le Hong Hiep's (2013) analysis of performance-based legitimacy of 
autocratic one-party rule in Vietnam.  
7
  According to the Vietnam General Statistics Office, the number of state officials in 
Hanoi is at one million, while the city's population is approximately seven million. 
This makes the state by far the largest employer in Vietnam's political capital.    
8
  Annually, Vietnam's bureaucracy produces not less than about 600 circulars (thông 
tư), 100 decisions (nghị định) and a few thousand other official (legal) documents 
(công văn) that are to be implemented by different state agencies at various 
administrative scales (Tuổi Trẻ 12 February 2015).  
9
  The author wishes to thank Hans-Dieter Evers and Gabi Waibel for commenting on 
earlier drafts of this paper.   
10
 This is based on informal talks and observations made by the author over the past eight 
years of doing research in Vietnam.  
11
  http://www.un.org/en/globalissues/governance/ (accessed 04 June 2014). 
12
  This term was borrowed from Thayer (1995). 
13
  This refers to Fukuyama (1992) and his hypothesis that with the collapse of the Soviet 
Unions, Western-like capitalism, in combination with democracy, would prevail as 
the paramount development model globally.  
14
  In 2011, PAR was extended for a second phase, lasting from 2011 to 2020 
(Government of Vietnam 2011).  
15
  Local government structures adhere to tiered subordination. Each province has line 
departments (sở) which are linked to the respective ministry in Hanoi, while at the 
same time being subordinated to its provincial People's Committee in a horizontal 
direction. The same structures apply at the next lower level, where district offices 
(phòng) report to the district People's Committee and the respective provincial 
department in equal measure. The Ministry of Health, for instance, is linked to the 
provincial Departments of Health, and the latter oversees all district Offices of Health 
within a given province.   
16
  Geertz describes how Javanese paddy farmer communities coped with a subsistence 
crisis of extreme severity when the Dutch colonial administration occupied 
agricultural land previously under paddy production and subjected people to an 
exploitative system of sugarcane production. At the same time as demographic 
pressure was increasing, possibilities for land reclamation were declining. In 
response, communities managed to intensify production on less land, which allowed 
for a stable per capita paddy output. This was achieved by an inward-oriented 
IJAPS, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1–40, 2016   Simon Benedikter 
35 
 
 
development of traditional rural institutions, which led to more social complexity but 
secured subsistence along moral economic ideas of shared poverty (Geertz 1963). 
17
  This refers to cities under direct management of the central government (thành phố 
trực thuộc Trung Ương), which have an administrative status equal to provinces.  
18
  Data from on the General Statistics Office of Vietnam (GSO).  
19
  The total number of plans to be drafted, adopted and implemented by the state 
apparatus across its different administrative scales is immense, exceeding 19,000 for 
the time period 2011 to 2020, as the Vietnam's Ministry of Planning and Investment 
recently estimated. This includes not only land use plans or infrastructure 
development plans, but also more than 3,000 production plans for the industrial and 
agricultural sector (Saigon Time 6 June 2014). 
20
 This refers to the Vietnamese phrase cơ chế xin cho, describing top-down resource 
allocation as rigidly applied in the era of central planning.  
21
  Một người làm quan cả hộ được nhờ. 
22
  According to Vietnam's civil service codex, the recruitment and promotion of civil 
servants must be carried out along examination-based, competitive, transparent 
qualification-oriented and objective procedures (National Assembly of Vietnam 
2008).  
23
  To provide an additional example of the many cases that exist: in 2013, it was 
revealed by the media that a high-ranking central official promoted about 60 cadres 
into higher positions under dubious conditions. Notably, this took place in the six 
month prior to his retirement (Tuổi Trẻ 4 March 2013).     
24
  In-service programmes (đại học tại chức) are being offered by universities and 
colleges using simplified curricula, which allow civil servants to obtain Bachelor of 
Arts (BA) or Master of Arts (MA) qualifications quickly and with minimal effort, 
while continue to work in their agencies.     
25
  This is on the basis of informal talks in 2012 and 2013 in the Mekong Delta region. 
The name of the agency is withheld by the author in order to guarantee anonymity to 
the informant.  
26
  In 2014, the author was an advisor to an institute, the name of which will be withheld.  
27
  Confirming this, Zink (2013: 161–162) found that many government offices in 
Vietnam, especially in Hanoi, are populated by staff coming from to two to three 
extended kinship networks, including different generations (senior and junior staff).  
28
  While working in Hanoi for a governmental agency at the central administrative scale, 
junior staff of the author's department officially earned about VND 3 million per 
month (around USD 140), which is even below the threshold of income taxation. 
When conducting field work in the Mekong Delta in 2010, the author learnt that 
newly recruited staff in provincial agencies earned about VND 1.2 million (USD 60).   
29
  The bulk of grants and loans provided is assumed to be spent differently from its 
intended purpose, with the majority ending up in the informal cash economy of the 
civil service. See Zink (2013: 230) for the example of ODA destined for combating 
climate change impacts in Vietnam. During the time the author worked for a 
ministerial agency in Hanoi, which managed extensive donor funding, the author 
witnessed how frequently (especially before Vietnamese New Year) money that was 
sequestered from different projects was distributed among staff in envelops as salary 
augments in amounts exceeding official monthly salaries by many times.  
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30
  These observations were made while the author was working as an advisor in a 
ministerial agency in Hanoi. Most of the author's colleagues, for instance, possessed 
expensive smart phones, tablets, laptops, etc. Some even came to work by their 
privately owned cars.  
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